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Gooder: Selective Abortion Bans

SELECTIVE ABORTION BANS: THE BIRTH OF A NEW STATE
COMPELLING INTEREST
Tori Gooder

I. INTRODUCTION

Roe v. Wade is one of the most notorious cases in American
history because it established that a woman has a constitutional right
to choose to have an abortion.1 Ever since this landmark case, the
Supreme Court has attempted to outline a jurisprudence that protects
this constitutional right, while acknowledging various state
interests—which has proved to be a difficult task. Because there are
few Supreme Court cases regarding abortion jurisprudence, the lower
courts have faced, and will continue to face, an uphill battle
concerning how a state may regulate this constitutional right to obtain
an abortion.
As of September 16, 2018, at least twelve states have enacted
some type of selective abortion ban, all of which prohibit a physician
from performing an abortion on a woman if her reason for obtaining
the abortion is based on the sex, race, and/or genetic disability of the
fetus. Because of differing interpretations of Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, and the most recent Supreme Court decisions, Gonzales v.
Carhart and Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, it is unclear
whether these selective abortion bans will fail under Casey’s undue
burden standard.2 However, considering the Court’s apparent dislike
for absolute bans on pre-viability abortions in Casey, many of the
broader selective abortion bans are likely to be held
unconstitutional—as shown by the Indiana Southern District Court
overturning Indiana’s Sex Selective and Disability Abortion Ban.3
This article explores the United States’ complicated abortion
jurisprudence and its implications that the Supreme Court may be
open to a new state compelling interest to weigh against a woman’s
right to an abortion. Part II of this article analyzes how the
constitutional right to an abortion developed from Roe v. Wade to
Whole Woman’s Health.4 In addition, this section examines the
1. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
2. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124
(2007); Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
3. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm'r, Ind. State Dep't of Health, 265 F. Supp.
3d 859, 866-67 (S.D. Ind. 2017).
4. Roe, 410 U.S. at 116; Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2292.
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different state selective abortion bans enacted throughout the country
and the challenges these statutes have encountered in the lower
courts—including the American Civil Liberties Union’s (“ACLU”)
recent complaint filed against Ohio’s selective Down syndrome
abortion ban. Part III investigates the recent trend from states with
selective abortion bans to establish discrimination as a new
compelling state interest in regulating abortions pre-viability, and the
constitutional muster this trending interest holds. Then, this article
examines the new prenatal technology and the opportunities it
provides for a completely new compelling state interest in the
abortion discussion—prohibition of abortion as a tool for eugenics.
Finally, the article discusses Ohio’s selective Down syndrome
abortion ban and the Ohio statute’s ability to satisfy Casey’s undue
burden analysis.
II. BACKGROUND

Under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, a woman has a constitutional right to choose to have
an abortion.5 Ever since Roe granted a woman the right to obtain an
abortion, the Supreme Court has wrestled with the colliding interests
between the woman’s right and particular state interests. For
purposes of this article, the evolution of abortion jurisprudence will
set up the framework to understand the current wave of selective
abortion bans developing in state legislation. Many states have
enacted selective abortion bans to prohibit a woman from obtaining
an abortion, if the reason for the abortion is based on the fetus’ sex,
race, or a diagnosis of disability. While challenges to the
constitutionality of these selective abortion bans are scarce in some
states, other courts have held the bans unconstitutional or temporarily
enjoined enforcement, while further litigation is pending. As of
March 23, 2018, Ohio joined the trend and enacted a selective
abortion ban, specifically prohibiting the performance of an abortion
on a woman whose reasons for the abortion are based on a fetus’
diagnosis for Down syndrome or another disability.
A. Abortion Jurisprudence

While the Constitution does not explicitly mention the right to
privacy, the Court has long recognized a fundamental right to

5. Roe, 410 U.S. at 116.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol87/iss2/6

2

Gooder: Selective Abortion Bans

2018]

SELECTIVE ABORTION BANS

547

personal privacy lurking in the shadows of the Constitution.6 In a
variety of contexts and cases, the Court, or individual Justices, have
found this “right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas
or zones of privacy,”7 to exist within the First Amendment,8 the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments,9 the Ninth Amendment,10 and the
Fourteenth Amendment.11 However, the bulk of the right to privacy
jurisprudence is rooted in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. This is not because the Due Process Clause mentions
privacy, but because it prohibits the state from depriving anyone of
“life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”12
1. Historical Context to the Right to Privacy

Historically, the Court has found the word “liberty” within the Due
Process Clause to encompass certain decisions and activities
considered “fundamental.”13 Whenever the Court deems these liberty
interests sufficiently “fundamental,” the state’s regulation of these
rights “may be justified only by a compelling interest, and legislative
enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate
state interests at stake.”14
The Court concretely defined this right to privacy in Griswold v.
Connecticut.15 In Griswold, the Supreme Court held a Connecticut
statute prohibiting any person from using any drug or article to
prevent conception in violation of the right to marital privacy
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.16 Although neither the
Constitution nor the Bill of Rights explicitly guarantees a right to
privacy, the Court found the Bill of Rights to have “penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give life and
substance,” that warrant a zone of privacy around certain personal

6. Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
7. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
8. Stanley v. Ga., 394 U.S. 557, 564-65 (1969) (holding statutes making mere private
possession obscene material in the privacy of an individual’s home a crime in violation of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments).
9. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968) (finding the Fourth and Fifth Amendments allows an
individual to “harbor a reasonable ‘expectation of privacy’”).
10. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486-87 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
11. Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding that parents have a fundamental right to
the personal private choice of education for their children).
12. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
13. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53.
14. Id. at 155.
15. Griswold , 381 U.S. at 479.
16. Id. at 486.
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choices held to be fundamental.17 In the past, the Court has extended
this privacy right to activities relating to procreation,18 family
relationships,19 child rearing, and education.20
Drawing from these past cases, the Court once again expanded the
privacy right to include the personal choice between a married couple
to use contraceptives or not.21 The Court in Griswold found the
state’s interest in regulating the use of contraceptives swept
“unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade[d]” the zone of privacy
that protects marital intimacy.22 Soon after Griswold, the Court
naturally extended this privacy right to decide “whether to bear or
beget a child” to all individuals—whether single or married—in
Eisenstadt v. Baird.23
2. The Right to an Abortion

Both Griswold and Eisenstadt set up the Supreme Court to decide
Roe v. Wade in 1973, expanding the right of personal privacy to
include a woman's decision whether to obtain an abortion.24
However, the Court held this right was not absolute, but “must be
considered against important state interests in regulation.”25 In order
to define the breadth of the state’s regulatory interests, the Court
outlined a trimester framework to balance the state’s interest to
protect the health of the pregnant woman and the potential of human
life and the woman’s fundamental right to choose.26
During the first trimester, the woman has a complete right to
obtain an abortion and the state’s interest is not “compelling” enough
to regulate the woman’s choice during this time.27 However, during
the second trimester, the state’s interest grows more compelling, and
it therefore may regulate certain aspects of abortions, as long as the
regulations reasonably relate to the preservation and protection of
maternal health.28 The state may completely outlaw abortions during
17.
18.
19.
20.
35 (1925).
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 484.
Skinner v. Okla., 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390, 401-03 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
Id.
405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
Id.
Id. at 162-63.
Id. at 163.
Id. at 165.
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the third trimester, because the state’s interest is at its most
“compelling point,” but there must be an exception for the life or
health of the mother.29
The first test for Roe’s holding was in Webster v. Reproduction
Health Services.30 In Webster, the Court held Missouri’s statutory
prohibition against the use of public funds, employees, and facilities
to provide abortions to be valid in light of Roe and the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.31 While a woman has a right
to choose whether to obtain an abortion, that right does not extend so
far as to require that states fund abortions.32 Nor does the
Constitution require states to provide public access and facilities for
the performance of abortions.33 As long as the state does not place an
impermissible “governmental obstacle in the path of a woman who
chooses to terminate her pregnancy,” the state may refuse to fund or
assist abortions under Roe.34
The essence of Roe dramatically altered in 1992, when the Court in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey shifted its analysis from the trimester
framework to an analysis that turns on viability.35 Under Roe, the
state was unable to interfere during the first trimester because the
state’s interest was not compelling until viability.36 Contrastingly, the
Court in Casey allowed state interference before viability; the caveat
being that any regulation could not be an “undue burden” on the
woman and still furthered a legitimate and compelling interest.37 In
Casey, the Court rejected Roe’s trimester framework, holding that it
“misconceive[d] the nature of the pregnant woman’s interest” and
“undervalue[d] the State’s interest in potential life.”38 Arguably, the
“undue burden” allowed for more freedom for the states to regulate
before viability.39
In Casey, the plaintiff, Planned Parenthood, challenged five
particular provisions of a Pennsylvania statute: (1) a requirement that

29. Id.
30. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
31. Id. at 509.
32. Id. at 510.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 509.
35. Greer Donley, Does the Constitution Protect Abortions Based on Fetal Anomaly?:
Examining the Potential for Disability-Selective Abortion Bans in the Age of Prenatal Whole Genome
Sequencing, 20 UNIV. OF MICH. J. OF GENDER & L. 291, 319 (2013).
36. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (defining viability as the fetus’ capability of
meaningful life outside the mother’s womb).
37. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992).
38. Id. at 873.
39. Donley, supra note 35, at 319.
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a woman give informed consent twenty-four hours before the
abortion procedure; (2) a requirement that at least one parent give
consent if the woman is a minor; (3) a requirement for the woman, if
married, inform her husband; (4) an exception to these requirements
for women in medical emergencies; and (5) particular record keeping
and recording requirements for the facilities performing abortions.40
Out of the five provisions challenged, the Court struck down only the
spousal notification requirement.41 The Court acknowledged that the
challenged structural mechanisms might impose some burdens on a
woman; but as long as the state regulations are not an “undue
burden”—that is a “substantial obstacle to the woman’s exercise of
the right to choose” —the Court will uphold the provision if
reasonably related to that state interest.42
After Casey only three core principles of Roe survived. First and
foremost, a woman has a right, protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, to choose to have an abortion before
viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the state.43
Second, states have the power to restrict abortions after fetal
viability, as long as the law contains exceptions for pregnancies that
endanger the life or health of the mother.44 Third, states have
“legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting
the health of the woman and the life of the fetus.”45 Leaving the rest
of Roe behind, the Court in Casey held that an undue burden exists,
and a provision is invalid, “if its purpose or effect is to place a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion
before the fetus attains viability.”46
3. The Abortion Right Post-Casey

In the wake of Casey, few abortion cases have made it to the
Supreme Court, and for this reason, there is little Supreme Court
jurisprudence to help the lower courts interpret the undue burden
analysis.47 Both Stenberg v. Carhart and Gonzales v. Carhart
involved state prohibitions on the use of the dilation and extraction

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Casey, 505 U.S. at 844.
Id. at 879.
Id. at 877-78.
Id. at 846.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 878.
Donley, supra note 35, at 320.
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abortion procedure (also known as partial-birth abortion).48 Stenberg
involved a Nebraska statute that criminalized performance of “partial
birth abortions.”49 The Court held the statute was unconstitutional
under the Casey undue burden analysis for two specific reasons.
First, the Court found it was an undue burden to prohibit “partial
birth abortion” procedures without a health exception for the
woman.50 Second, the Court held the Nebraska statute was
unconstitutionally vague because the language covered another
dominant abortion procedure, D&E.51 The Court noted that if the
statute was to be interpreted as a prohibition on both the “partial birth
abortion” and the D&E procedure, then “the result is an undue
burden upon a woman’s right to make an abortion decision.”52
Just seven years after the Court decided Stenberg, the federal
government enacted the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act.53 Similar to
the Nebraska statute in Stenberg, the federal statute criminalized the
performance of partial-birth abortion procedures.54 However, unlike
the Nebraska statute, the Act included a health exception to save the
life of the mother and distinguished between the partial-birth abortion
procedure and the D&E procedure.55 Because of these differences,
the Supreme Court held that the Act did not place an undue burden
on a woman and the statute was not unconstitutionally vague.56
Further, the Court heavily relied on the government’s “legitimate and
substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life” as a
justification for the regulations on a woman’s right to an abortion.57
These seemingly contradictory holdings created tension around the
undue burden analysis. Since Casey, the only regulations understood
to be an undue burden were spousal consent requirements and bans
on both D&E and partial-birth abortions. The country had to wait
almost ten years before the Supreme Court added to the undue
48. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). Partial
birth abortion is a procedure where “the abortionist initiates the woman’s natural delivery process by
causing the cervix of the woman to be dilated…the physician manually performs breech extraction of
the body of a live fetus…[w]ith only the head of the fetus remaining in utero” where the head is then
separated from the fetus’ body. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 959-60.
49. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 929.
50. Id. at 938.
51. Id. at 939. D&E procedure “requires the abortionist to use instruments to grasp a portion
(such as a foot or hand) of a developed and living fetus and drag the grasped portion out of the uterus
into the vagina.” Id. at 958.
52. Id. at 946.
53. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 141.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 147-48.
57. Id. at 145.
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burden list in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.58 In this case,
Texas enacted a Bill that required (1) doctors performing abortions to
obtain admitting privileges from a hospital located no further than
thirty miles from the location the abortion was performed,59 and (2)
the abortion facility to meet the minimum standards, under Texas
law, for ambulatory surgical centers.60 The Supreme Court found
both the admitting-privileges requirement and the surgical-center
requirement to be an undue burden on a woman’s constitutional right
to obtain an abortion.61
However, the Court deviated from Casey’s undue burden standard,
ever so slightly. Instead of evaluating the statutes burden on the
woman’s choice to terminate her pregnancy, the Court concentrated
on whether the regulation granted “medical benefits sufficient to
justify the burdens” that placed a “substantial obstacle in the path of
the woman seeking a pre-viability abortion.”62 This slight, but
critical, deviation from Casey emphasizes the Court’s readiness to
observe abortion regulations more in light of the state’s interest and
less in light of the woman’s right to choose an abortion.63
B. The Trend Towards Anti-Discrimination Pre-viability Regulations

Abortion jurisprudence looks very different today than it did after
the original holding in Roe. Post-Roe cases have drastically changed
Roe’s initial presumption that all state regulation on pre-viability
abortions is per se unconstitutional.64 The Court in Casey paved the
way for more state regulation on abortion care, even during the first
trimester, as long as the state’s vested interest is in the woman’s
health and to promote fetal life.65 As a result, both states and the
federal government have passed a plethora of regulations on
abortions, attempting to identify the expansive new boundaries of
Casey’s undue burden test.66 Generally, abortion regulations by states
and the federal government are not new, however regulations based
on the woman’s reasons for seeking an abortion are. This section will
58. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
59. Id. at 2310.
60. Id. at 2314.
61. Id. at 2318.
62. Id. at 2300.
63. Eighteenth Annual Review of Gender and the Law: Annual Review Article: Abortion, 18
GEO. J. GENDER & L. 395, 402 (2017).
64. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992).
65. Eighteenth Annual Review of Gender and the Law: Annual Review Article: Abortion, supra
note 63, at 402.
66. Id. at 402-03.
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examine closely the specific regulations states have enacted to stop
abortions when the woman bases her abortion decision on the fetus’
race, sex, and/or genetic abnormality.
In 2011, Arizona became one of the first states to enact legislation
threatening the physicians with a class three felony if they perform
“an abortion knowing that the abortion is sought based on the sex or
race of the child.”67 Interestingly, the woman on “whom a sexselection or race-selection abortion is performed is not subject to
criminal prosecution or civil liability.”68 Legislative history illustrates
that some Arizona legislators were concerned that abortion providers
were targeting African American and Hispanic women, and therefore
enacted the legislation to protect certain populations.69 The Maricopa
County chapter of the NAACP brought suit to enjoin the Arizona
selective abortion bill, arguing that the legislation had a stigmatizing
effect on African American and Hispanic women.70 However, the
Ninth Circuit held there was insufficient standing and affirmed the
district court’s dismissal.71
Currently, Arizona is the only state to have enacted both raceselective and sex-selective abortion prohibitions.72 However, many
other states have followed Arizona’s lead and have enacted sexselective and/or genetic anomaly abortion bans. Currently, eight
states prohibit sex-selective abortions at some point during
pregnancy.73 Three states, North Dakota, Ohio, and Louisiana
prohibit abortions for reason of genetic anomaly, such as Down
syndrome.74 However, both Louisiana and Ohio have a court ordered
temporary injunction on the legislation, pending litigation.75
Oklahoma, Kansas, and Arizona require counseling about perinatal
hospice services if seeking abortion based on lethal fetal condition or
abnormality.76 The only state to have a ban deemed unconstitutional

67. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3603.02(A)(1) (2011).
68. § 13-3603.02(E) (emphasis added).
69. Ariz. Leg. 2443, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011).
70. NAACP v. Horne, 626 F. App'x 200, 201 (9th Cir. 2015).
71. Id. (holding that “only to ‘those persons who are personally denied equal treatment’ by the
challenged discriminatory conduct” may have standing to bring a claim for a “stigmatizing injury”).
72. Abortion Bans in Cases of Sex or Race Selection or Genetic Anomaly, GUTTMACHER INST.
(Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/abortion-bans-cases-sex-or-raceselection-or-genetic-anomaly.
73. Id. The eight states include Arizona, Arkansas, Kansas, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota.
74. Id.
75. Id.; See also Jessie Hellmann, Federal judge blocks Ohio Down syndrome abortion ban, THE
HILL (Mar. 14, 2018).
76. Abortion Bans in Cases of Sex or Race Selection or Genetic Anomaly, supra note 72.
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is Indiana.77
In 2017, the Indiana Southern District Court held the state’s Sex
Selective and Disability Abortion Ban unconstitutional under Casey’s
undue burden standard and Roe’s essential holding.78 The statute
prohibited physicians from performing abortions if the woman sought
an abortion: (1) “solely because of the sex of the fetus;”79 (2) “solely
because the fetus has been diagnosed with Down syndrome or has a
potential diagnosis of Down syndrome;”80 or (3) “solely because of
the race, color, national origin, or ancestry of the fetus.”81 The statute
also mandated that the abortion providers inform their patients
“Indiana does not allow a fetus to be aborted solely because of the
fetus’ race, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, or diagnosis or
potential diagnosis of the fetus having Down syndrome or any other
disability.”82
In defending its statute, the Indiana government argued that
technological advances have increased the state’s legitimate interest
in protecting potential life from discrimination.83 The technological
advances, argued the state, allows for an earlier understanding of a
fetus’ diagnosis or potential diagnosis of Down syndrome or other
disabilities, which in turn has led to an increase in abortions sought
for reasons related to these disabilities.84 While the court recognized
that the state has “legitimate interests from the outset of the
pregnancy in protecting . . . the life of the fetus that may become a
child,” those interests are “not strong enough to support a prohibition
of abortion” pre-viability.85 In other words, new technological
developments related to disability screening do not increase the
state’s interest in protecting the potential life enough to outweigh the
woman’s liberty interest in choosing to terminate her pregnancy prior
to viability, at least under Roe and Casey’s holdings.86
The court quickly dismissed the state’s second argument that the
statute does not interfere with a right protected by Roe and Casey if
observed through a “binary choice” interpretation.87 The state
77. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm'r, Ind. State Dep't of Health, 265 F. Supp.
3d 859 (S.D. Ind. 2017).
78. Id. at 867.
79. Ind. Code Ann. § 16-34-4-4 (2016).
80. § 16-34-4-6.
81. § 16-34-4-8.
82. § 16-34-2-1.1(a)(1)(K).
83. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 265 F. Supp. 3d at 867.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 866 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992)).
86. Id. at 867-68.
87. Id. at 868.
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perceived Roe and Casey to protect a woman’s right to terminate her
pregnancy only if the woman does not want a child generally at that
point in time, as opposed to terminating the pregnancy based on the
potential characteristics of that particular child.88 The court found no
support in Roe, Casey, or any legal authority that such a distinction
exists in the eyes of the Supreme Court.89 Moreover, the court
reminded the state that the Fourteenth Amendment protects a
woman’s liberty right to terminate her pregnancy based on a right to
privacy.90 Accordingly, the court believed this right to privacy “to
make important, personal, and difficult decision[s] of whether to
terminate” prohibits against state regulations on any reasons or
factors that may influence this private decision.91
While the Indiana Southern District Court held Indiana’s selective
abortion ban unconstitutional, both North Dakota and Ohio have
enacted extremely similar legislation. In 2013, North Dakota enacted
legislation that makes it a class A misdemeanor for physicians to
intentionally perform abortions on women who seek to have an
abortion solely “on account of the sex of the unborn child” or
“because the unborn child has been diagnosed with either a genetic
abnormality or a potential for a genetic abnormality.”92 The law
defines genetic abnormality even broader than Indiana’s statute, not
including an exception for a “lethal fetal anomaly.”93 In its definition
of genetic abnormality, the law includes: “any defect, disease, or
disorder that is inherited genetically” and “any disfigurement,
scoliosis, dwarfism, Down syndrome, albinism, amelia, or any other
type of physical or mental disability, abnormality, or disease.”94 Yet,
even with North Dakota’s broader definition of abnormality, the
specific prohibition has yet to be challenged on substantive due
process grounds—leaving the statute to cover most disability
diagnoses recognized during prenatal testing.95
Ohio’s legislation, effective as of March 2018, is both broader and
narrower than Indiana and North Dakota’s prohibitions on selective
abortions.96 Instead of prohibiting abortions based on a myriad of
disabilities or abnormalities, the Ohio statute only bans abortions for

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 868-69.
N.D. Cent Code § 14-02.1-04.1 (2013).
Ind. Code Ann. § 16-34-4-1 (2016).
§ 14-02.1-02.
§ 14-02.1-02. See Donley, supra note 35, at 304.
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2919.10.
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women who seek the abortion because the fetus has Down syndrome
or potentially has Down syndrome.97 However, the language of the
statute does not mandate that Down syndrome be the sole reason for
the abortion, but prohibits the abortion if it is sought “in whole or in
part” because of Down syndrome.98 Unlike both Indiana and North
Dakota’s statute, Ohio bans the performance of abortions for reasons
of Down syndrome, but not for reasons of sex or race.99 The ACLU
filed a complaint on behalf of Planned Parenthood and other abortion
providers, and recently the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio temporarily enjoined the ban.100
III. ANALYSIS

Traditionally, the Supreme Court has recognized compelling state
interests such as the health of the mother and the potential life of the
fetus. However, under particular interpretations of Gonzales and
Whole Woman’s Health, the Supreme Court has recently opened
itself to consider other compelling interests. States have taken
advantage of this opportunity and presented compelling interests such
as eradicating discrimination and protecting the potential life from
discrimination. Yet, another compelling interest may be even more
persuasive and pressing to the Supreme Court: the prohibition of
abortion as a tool for eugenics. Regardless of Ohio’s compelling
interest in enacting the selective Down syndrome abortion ban, the
Southern District of Ohio Court will likely find the statute
unconstitutional under Casey’s undue burden test because of the
broad statutory language and the substantial obstacle it places in front
of a woman’s ability to obtain an abortion pre-viability.
A. Discrimination as a Compelling State interest

Under many of the selective abortion bans, it is unclear what
exactly the state’s compelling interest is. In the recent Indiana case
striking down Indiana’s Sex Selective and Disability Ban, the state’s
compelling interest was protecting the potential life from
discrimination.101 On the other hand, states have introduced more
untraditional interests foreign to abortion jurisprudence, such as the
97. § 2919.10(B).
98. § 2919.10(B).
99. § 2919.10.
100. Preterm-Cleveland v. Himes, 294 F. Supp. 3d 746, 749 (S.D. Ohio 2018).
101. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r, Ind. State Dep’t of Health, 265 F. Supp.
3d 859, 867 (S.D. Ind. 2017).
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elimination of discrimination based on sex, race, or disability from
society.102 Both of these state interests have a chance of surviving
Casey’s undue burden analysis if limited to post-viability. However,
the interests will have much more difficulty surviving Casey if the
bans are applicable pre-viability. Almost all of the selective abortion
bans enacted or proposed, including Ohio and Indiana, are in effect
throughout the woman’s pregnancy.
Accordingly, all of the bans must satisfy the standards set for previability and post-viability state regulations provided in Casey.103 For
post-viability selective abortion bans, satisfying Roe’s essential
holding and Casey’s undue burden analysis is much easier:
“subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the
potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even
proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate
medical judgment for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother.”104 As many of the selective abortion bans contain the word
“solely,” a narrow post-viability selective abortion ban can satisfy
Casey’s undue burden analysis, without any health exception for the
mother.105 If a woman seeks an abortion because her life is in danger,
then accordingly she is not seeking the abortion procedure solely
based on the sex, race, or disability of the fetus, and therefore the
procedure will not be prohibited.106
However, pre-viability selective bans find the undue burden
analysis more difficult to hurdle, due to the uncertainty of whether
pre-viability bans are per se unconstitutional. The courts disagree as
to whether Casey categorically holds all pre-viability bans as
prohibited regardless of the undue burden analysis107 or whether
Casey’s undue analysis places a blanket moratorium on pre-viability
bans only if the ban heavily infringes on a woman’s ability to make
the “ultimate decision.”108 Yet, recent abortion jurisprudence
102. Thomas J. Molony, Roe, Casey, and Sex-Selective Abortion Bans, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1089, 1109 (2014).
103. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 156 (2007) (explaining that “[t]he abortions affected by
the Act’s regulations take place both pre-viability and post-viability; so . . . the undue burden analysis . .
. [is] applicable.”).
104. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992) (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 164-65 (1973)).
105. Molony, supra note 102, at 1104.
106. Id.
107. See Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F. 3d 1213, 1225 (9th Cir. 2013); MKB Mgmt. Corp. v.
Stenehjem, 795 F.3d 768, 772 (8th Cir. 2015); Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm'r, Ind.
State Dep't of Health, 265 F. Supp. 3d 859, 867 (S.D. Ind. 2017).
108. McCormack v. Hiedeman, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1151 (D. Idaho 2013); Reprod. Health
Servs. v. Marshall, 268 F. Supp. 3d 1261, 1270 (M.D. Ala. 2017); Whole Woman’s Health v. Paxton,
No. A-17-CV-690-LY (W.D. Tex. 2017).
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developed in Gonzales and Whole Woman’s Health implies that a
third interpretation may be available: the undue burden analysis
applies to pre-viability bans, and government interests different from
those traditionally considered—health of the mother and protection
of potential life—are relevant in the undue burden inquiry.109
If applying either of the first two interpretations of Casey, any
selective abortion pre-viability ban, no matter the state’s compelling
interest, would not survive a constitutional inquiry. Accordingly, if
following the Ninth Circuit’s categorical approach, a pre-viability
selective abortion “prohibition on the exercise of [the abortion] right
is per se unconstitutional,” and thereby the state “may not proscribe a
woman from electing abortion . . . .”110 Similarly, if applying Casey’s
undue burden test to pre-viability selective abortion bans effect on a
woman’s ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy, the ban would
be invalid because it places more than “a substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus,”111 but an
“insurmountable” or “absolute” obstacle.112
However, under the third interpretation, pre-viability selective
abortion bans have a better chance of surviving Casey’s undue
burden analysis. As an agitated Justice Ginsburg pointed out in her
dissent, the Supreme Court in Gonzales took into account other
interests when applying Casey’s undue burden test to the federal
partial-birth abortion ban.113 The Court recognized the traditional Roe
and Casey state interests in protecting potential life and the health of
the mother, but it also focused on the government’s “interest in
protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession.”114
Moreover, the Court acknowledged moral and ethical concerns,
finding the D&E procedure had the power to “devalue human
life.”115
Whole Woman’s Health expanded Casey’s undue burden analysis
one-step further than Gonzales. While many pro-choice groups
rallied behind Whole Woman’s Health’s holding, the Court’s opinion
ever so slightly deviated from the previous interpretation of Casey’s

109. Molony, supra note 102, at 1105.
110. Isaacson, 716 F. 3d at 1217.
111. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
112. McCormack, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1151.
113. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 182 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Ultimately, the
Court admits that ‘moral concerns’ are at work, concerns that could yield prohibitions on any abortion.
Notably, the concerns expressed are untethered to any ground genuinely serving the Government’s
interest in preserving life.”).
114. Id. at 157.
115. Id. at 158.
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undue burden analysis.116 In fact, the Court reframed the undue
burden analysis illustrating its willingness to look closely at the
particular abortion regulations in light of whether the means behind
the regulations actually justify and serve the state’s interests.117
Therefore, since the Texas surgical center and admitting privileges
requirements produced a “substantial obstacle in the path of women
seeking a pre-viability abortion” without “confer[ing] medical
benefits sufficient to justify the burdens,” the Court held the statute
impermissible.118 Together, Gonzales and Whole Woman’s Health
illustrate the Court’s willingness to apply Casey’s undue burden test
broadly to pre-viability abortion regulations as long as the state
regulation is substantial enough to justify and serve a compelling
state interest different from those established in Roe and Casey, such
as “protecting the potential life from discrimination”119 or eradicating
discrimination in society.
Applying this third interpretation of Casey to a state’s interest in
protecting the potential life from discrimination is bound to fail the
undue burden test. Not because the state interest is not legitimate, but
because protecting the “potential life from discrimination” is the
same state interest addressed in Roe and Casey, just repackaged. The
Court recognizes the “State has legitimate interests from the outset of
the pregnancy . . . the life of the fetus that may become a child,” but
refuses to allow that particular state interest to create a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy
prior to viability.120 Further, the Court in Roe refuses to address
whether “life begins at conception or at some other point prior to live
birth,” and therefore defines viability to be the time when the state’s
interest may become “compelling.”121 Accordingly, if the Court does
not recognize, or at least take a stance, on life at conception, then
discrimination cannot attach to a fetus because the Court does not
recognize a fetus as a legal person.122
On the other hand, a selective abortion ban grounded in a state’s
interest to eradicate discrimination in society might survive the post
Gonzales and Whole Woman’s Heath expansion of Casey’s undue
burden test. The state’s interest in ending discrimination might be a

116. Eighteenth Annual Review of Gender and the Law, supra note 63, at 402.
117. Id.; Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016).
118. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300.
119. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm'r, Ind. State Dep't of Health, 265 F. Supp.
3d 859, 867 (S.D. Ind. 2017).
120. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
121. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150, 163 (1973).
122. Id. at 158.
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new development in the arena of abortion jurisprudence. However,
this interest is a familiar and recognized state interest in the
constitutional realm of freedom of association for expressive
purposes.123
In a line of freedom of association cases, the Court pondered
whether public accommodation statutes that prohibited
discrimination based on race, sex, sexual orientation, or religion
unconstitutionally violated a group’s associational rights. 124 The
Court applied an “undue burden-like balancing test,” instead of strict
scrutiny, in all of the cases.125 In two of the cases, the Court held that
the state’s interest in eliminating sex discrimination was compelling
and justified the statute that infringed on the group’s associational
rights.126 Importantly, the Court in Roberts v. United States, Board of
Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte, and Boy
Scouts of American v. Dale only permits infringement in expressive
associational rights when the infringement is slight and when the
state has a compelling interest, such as eradication of discrimination
that is “unrelated to the suppression of ideas.”127
Applying this same line of reasoning, there might be a reasonable
argument that a state’s compelling interest in eradicating
discrimination justifies a slight infringement on a woman’s right to
choose.128 There is ample room to attack this argument, beginning
with the notion that a selective abortion ban pre-viability is far from a
slight infringement. Yet, there is a possibility that a narrow selective
abortion ban with the infringement on a woman’s right to choose
tailored to the word “solely” might have constitutional muster in light
of a state’s compelling interest. The woman’s choice is only
infringed upon if her decision to terminate her pregnancy is “solely”
based on the fetus’ sex, race, or potential disability, and therefore if
any other reason is presented for the abortion, then the woman’s right
to choice trumps the state’s compelling interest. Drawing on the
eradication of discrimination as a compelling state interest, there

123. Molony, supra note 102, at 1118.
124. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984); Board of Directors of Rotary
International v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); Boy Scouts of America v. Dale 530 U.S.
640 (2000).
125. Molony, supra note 102, at 1118-1119.
126. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628-29 (holding that a state public accommodation statute did not
violate the constitutional rights of the United States Jaycees by mandating the group admit women as
full voting members); Duarte, 481 U.S. at 549 (holding that a state public accommodation statute did
not violate the constitutional associational rights of Rotary International by requiring the group open its
membership to women, and not exclusively to men); Dale, 530 U.S. at 640.
127. Molony, supra note 102, at 1123; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
128. Molony, supra note 102, at 1129.
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might be an even more powerful interest for the state to put forth: the
prohibition of abortion as a tool for eugenics.
B. A New Compelling State Interest

While the eradication of discrimination is a worthwhile state
interest and has some merit, there is an even more powerful interest
that the Court, and the world in general, has already wrestled with for
centuries: eugenics. A term coined in 1883 by Francis Galton,
eugenics is a term used to refer to the practice of improving the
human race by controlling reproduction.129 Although connected most
notoriously to the Nazi regime, eugenics was a movement founded in
the United States at the turn-of-the-century.130 The American
eugenics movement sponsored “forced sterilization of criminals and
the [mentally disabled], selective ethnic restrictions on immigration,
and even euthanasia for those deemed unfit to live.”131
The eugenics movement colors America’s history. In the famous
words of Justice Holmes in Buck v. Bell, “three generations of
imbeciles are enough,” justified the use of compulsory sterilization
against a “patient afflicted with hereditary forms of insanity,
imbecility.”132 Not only did the Supreme Court support the use of
eugenics, but the federal and state legislatures did as well. In 1924,
Congress enacted the Federal Immigration Restriction Act to curb the
“rising tide of defective germ-plasm” carried by particular suspected
classes of migrants journeying from Southern and Eastern Europe.133
States, during the 1970s, required genetic screening programs of
African Americans for sickle cell anemia (an inherited disease
commonly developed in people of African descent).134
As genetic technology continues to develop, a modern form of
eugenics becomes more and more plausible. Just recently, in 2010, a
major change in prenatal genetic testing occurred, allowing women to
obtain a non-invasive prenatal genetic test as earlier as ten weeks into
their pregnancy.135 This prenatal genetic test provides for hundreds
and potentially thousands of traits with a single blood test, thereby
129. Martin S. Pernick, Eugenics and Public Health in American History, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
1767, 1767 (1997).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. 274 U.S. 200, 206-07 (1927).
133. Paul A. Lombardo, Medicine, Eugenics, and the Supreme Court: From Coercive Sterilization
to Reproductive Freedom, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 5 (1996).
134. Sonia M. Suter, The Allure and Peril of Genetics Exceptionalism: Do We Need Special
Genetics Legislation?, 79 WASH. U.L.Q. 669, 676 (2001).
135. Donley, supra note 35, at 297.
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providing women with the ability to find out any known genetic
markers their fetus contains, or may contain.136 These known genetic
markers span from Down syndrome, Tay Sachs, and Cystic Fibrosis
to breast cancer, heart disease, and diabetes.137 Not only does
prenatal genetic testing increase the mass amount of information
women have available to them regarding their fetus’ genetics, but the
prenatal genetic testing allows women to have this information as
early as ten weeks into their pregnancy.138
As Gonzales illustrated, the Supreme Court is open to other
legitimate state interests at play in abortion jurisprudence, such as the
“integrity and ethics of the medical profession.”139 Moreover, the
Court in Gonzales recognized Congress’ interest to create specific
prohibitions against abortions that “implicate additional ethical and
moral concerns” and to draw “a bright line that clearly distinguishes
abortion and infanticide.”140 Therefore, the Court looked much
further than the traditional interests of the state—the protection of the
potential life and the health of the mother—to justify the regulations.
The Court’s logic in Gonzales already connects abortion and
infanticide, a form of eugenics, and appears to be only a step away
from justifying selective abortion bans under the banner of
prohibiting the use of eugenics.
The potential state interest in preventing the use of abortion as a
means of eugenics is a compelling interest both before and after
viability. According to both Roe and Casey, the state interest in
protecting the potential life increases as the fetus develops, to the
point that it eventually outweighs the woman’s abortion right, with
the exception for “the preservation of the life or health of the
mother.”141 Yet, the potential state interest in preventing abortion as a
means of eugenics does not increase or decrease in correlation with
the viability of the fetus. The prevention of eugenics is just as
important an interest pre-viability as it is post-viability, and therefore
begs the question whether the prevention of eugenics as a compelling
state interest outweighs the woman’s abortion right from the moment
genetic testing provides the sex, race, or potential disabilities of the
fetus.
The Court’s application of Casey’s undue burden test in Whole
136. Id. at 297-98.
137. Id. at 301.
138. Id. at 302.
139. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007).
140. Id. at 158.
141. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 163-164 (1973).
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Woman’s Health also supports the idea that a new compelling interest
can outweigh a women’s privacy interest pre-viability. Reframing the
undue burden analysis in the dicta of the opinion, the Court exposes
its willingness to allow the ends to justify the means. While the
selective abortion ban might place a “substantial obstacle in the path
of women seeking a pre-viability abortion,” if the selective abortion
ban “confers [medical] benefits sufficient to justify the burdens,”
then the ban might be justified.142 Accordingly, the benefits must
derive from the state’s interests, and must outweigh the burdens
imposed upon a woman. The Court is required to “consider the
burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits
those laws confer.”143
Appropriately, if the benefits to preventing eugenics justify the
burden imposed on the woman’s privacy interest, then a selective
abortion ban just might survive the undue burden test. Obviously,
benefits include the specific moral and ethical values of protecting
the breeding out of certain sexes, races, and disabilities. The Court
has already recognized ethical and moral concerns as a compelling
state interest worth weighing in the abortion analysis. The D&E
procedure present in Gonzales had the power to “devalue human
life,”144 which the Court found to be a moral and ethical interest the
state may depend on, in addition to other compelling interests such as
ethics and integrity of medical professionals. Clearly, eugenics and
its history in America illustrates the ethical and moral concerns in
allowing individuals or governments to have the power to “devalue
human life” by deeming what races, sexes, or genetic disabilities are
worth bringing to life.
More broadly, selective abortion regulations can benefit society by
protecting public health and combating discrimination against
protected classes. Protecting America’s public health can benefit
society by preventing the grave social consequences of an
unbalanced male to female ratio, which is already an issue in other
parts of the world.145 The protection of public health may also
include prohibiting individuals from having the power to determine
what characteristics are desirable in a potential human being, and
thereby having the extraordinary power to filter particular types of
qualities. In terms the Court already recognizes, the “integrity and
142. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016).
143. Id. at 2309.
144. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 158.
145. Prabhat Jha et al., Trends in Selective Abortion of Female Fetuses in India: Analysis of
Nationally Representative Birth Histories from 1990-2005 and Census Data from 1991-2011, LANCET
1, 2 (2011) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3166246/.
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ethics of the medical profession” is hindered when medical
professionals are given not only the responsibility of disclosing to a
patient the prenatal genetic testing results that include a potential
disability or disease, but also the responsibility of directly performing
an abortion on the fetus, knowing the reasons for its termination. If
the integrity and ethics of medical professionals proved compelling
enough in Gonzales to justify the prohibition of partial-birth
procedures, then it is plausible that the same justification may be
upheld for prohibiting selective abortions.
The Court has already deemed state’s interests in combating
discrimination against protected classes to be a benefit to society, as
seen in the Roberts, Duarte, and Dale line of cases, and therefore a
compelling governmental interest to override the particular
fundamental liberties of expressive associational rights. Historically,
eugenics has been used to discriminate against certain types of
individuals based on their race, mental capabilities, and sex. The
Supreme Court itself held that a state may not use eugenics because
“invidious discriminations are made against groups or types of
individuals in violation of the constitutional guaranty of just and
equal laws,” and because the sterilization “perpetuate[s] the
discrimination which we have found to be fatal.”146 Similarity, in
Loving v. Virginia, many eugenic enthusiasts supported and helped
enact the 1924 Virginia Racial Integrity Act to combat the “threat to
the health of the while gene pool.”147 The Court held the state’s
miscegenation statute as unconstitutional in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause because of its discrimination and classification on
the basis of race.148
Clearly, the Court has already recognized the connection between
the use of eugenics and discrimination. Using the same line of
reasoning, when a state has a compelling interest, such as eradication
of discrimination, “unrelated to the suppression of ideas,”149 and is
only a slight infringement, then the statute may infringe on the
fundamental associational rights of particular groups. Accordingly,
this reasoning is applicable to the fundamental right of abortion as
well: the state’s compelling interest to combat and eradicate
discrimination, by prohibiting the use of eugenics, if unrelated to the
actual abortion right, may be compelling enough to infringe on the
146. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541, 543 (1942) (prohibiting sterilization of habitual
criminals).
147. 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Lombardo, supra note 133, at 20.
148. Loving, 388 U.S. at 1.
149. Molony, supra note 102, at 1123; Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623
(1984).
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fundamental right of abortion.
The argument against the use of selective abortion legislation will
be that the infringement on a woman’s right to abortion is not slight.
However, if selective abortions are narrowly tailored enough to
prohibit abortions only if based “solely” on the sex, race, or potential
disability, then the Court might consider the infringement slight. If
the benefits—protection of public health and eradication of
discrimination—derived from the state’s interests in prohibiting the
use of eugenics, outweigh the burdens imposed upon the woman’s
abortion right, then the selective abortion bans could be justifiable.
As prenatal genetic testing provides for information regarding the
fetus’ potential disabilities and other attributes as earlier as ten
weeks, the state’s compelling interest is just as heightened previability as post-viability, unlike previous state interests such as
health of the mother and the potential life of the fetus. Considering
the burdens selective abortion bans impose on abortion access
together with the benefits those laws confer, it would appear that
states’ selective abortion bans might confer a benefit that is just
compelling enough to outweigh a woman’s abortion right.
C. Ohio’s Down Syndrome Abortion law

While Ohio’s Down syndrome abortion law is distinct from
Indiana’s overruled Sex Selective and Disability Abortion Ban, the
Ohio law will likely fail Casey’s undue burden analysis, and
therefore violate a woman’s right to an abortion. There are two
differences that distinguish the Ohio statute from the Indiana statute:
(1) the prohibition on selective abortions is limited to only the
genetic abnormality of Down syndrome and other disabilities and (2)
the woman’s reasons for the abortion may be prohibited if based
either wholly or in part on a prenatal diagnosis of Down syndrome.150
However, these distinctions are unable to satisfy Casey’s undue
burden analysis, even when using the third interpretation of Casey in
light of the Gonzales and Whole Woman Health’s expansions.
Recently, the ACLU filed a complaint for declaratory and
injunctive relief to the Southern District Court of Ohio.151 The ACLU
argues that the Ohio law “imposes an unconstitutional undue burden
on the abortion right” and “violates the rights to liberty and privacy
secured to [women] by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

150. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2919.10.
151. Preterm-Cleveland et al., v. Himes, Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief, No. 1:18-cv-109 (S.D. Ohio 2018).
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Amendment to the United States Constitution.”152 To make this
determination, the Southern District Court of Ohio must decide
whether the Ohio prohibition on abortions based, in part or in whole,
on a diagnosis (or possible diagnosis) of Down syndrome, or another
disability, is a “substantial obstacle in the path of the woman seeking
a previability abortion.”153
The Ohio statute criminalizes the performance of abortions on a
pregnant woman if the provider has “knowledge that the pregnant
woman is seeking the abortion, in whole or in part” because a test,
prenatal diagnosis, or another resource indicates that the unborn child
will have Down syndrome, or another disability. 154 On the other
hand, the Indiana statute prohibits the performance of abortions
before or after viability if the person knows that the pregnant woman
is seeking an abortion solely because of (1) the sex of the fetus, (2)
the diagnosis of Down syndrome or any other disability, or (3) the
race of the fetus.155 The Ohio statute is obviously narrower than the
Indiana statute, criminalizing the performance of abortions only if the
reason for the abortion is because the fetus has a diagnosis of Down
syndrome or another disability.
However, ironically, the Ohio statute is much more of a substantial
obstacle to the woman’s obtainment of an abortion than the Indiana
statute because of its use of the words “in whole or in part.”156 The
reason for a woman to obtain an abortion only needs to be based “in
part” on the fetus’ indication of having Down syndrome.
Theoretically, this means that no matter how small a role a diagnosis
played into the woman’s decision, a doctor may not perform an
abortion. Therefore, the Ohio Southern District Court’s reasoning
will likely be similar to the Indiana District Court, finding the
selective abortion ban places a substantial obstacle in the path of the
woman seeking an abortion prior to fetal viability.157
Even if Ohio announces that the compelling interest behind the
Down syndrome selective abortion ban is to prohibit the use of
abortion as a tool for eugenics, the selective abortion ban will still
likely be held unconstitutional because the infringement on a
woman’s abortion right is not slight. However, if Ohio’s compelling
interest was to prohibit eugenics, and the statute only prohibited the
152. Id. at 3, 13.
153. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016).
154. § 2919.10(B).
155. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm'r, Ind. State Dep't of Health, 265 F. Supp.
3d 859, 862 (S.D. Ind. 2017).
156. § 2919.10 (B).
157. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., 256 F. Supp. 3d at 869.
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reason for the abortion to be “solely” based on the fetus’ disability,
then the statute might satisfy Casey. Applying the Court’s reasoning
in the culmination of the Roberts, Duarte, and Dale cases, the
infringement on a woman’s abortion right is only permitted when the
infringement is slight and when the state’s compelling interest, such
as prohibition of eugenics, is unrelated to the abortion right.
Accordingly, the word “solely” would limit the infringement on the
abortion right only to cases where the woman has absolutely based
her abortion decision on the fetus’ diagnosis of Down syndrome and
disclosed this absolute basis to the doctor performing the abortion.
A Court would hold the Ohio selective abortion ban
unconstitutional, even if the statute limited the prohibition of
selective Down syndrome abortions post-viability, because the Ohio
law contains no exception allowing the doctor to perform the
abortion when it is necessary to preserve the health or life of the
mother.158 As the Court has made clear, an undue burden exists when
the state heavily regulates abortions without a health exception for
the woman.159 In Gonzales, the partial-birth abortion ban was valid,
but only because the Act included a health exception to save the life
of the mother.160 In Indiana and other states that use the language
“solely,” a health exception is unnecessary because as long as the
woman has another reason to base her abortion decision on, such as
for her health or in an emergency, the statute does not limit her
ability to do so. On the other hand, Ohio’s statute’s use of “in whole
or in part” creates a need for the health exception. Otherwise, the
threat to the life of the mother, or any other medical emergency,
would be an unavailable exception to obtain an abortion, at least if
the reasoning for the abortion also included the fetus diagnosis of
Down syndrome or another disability. Therefore, the Ohio statute
with no health exception for the mother, just like the statute in
Gonzales, creates an undue burden on the woman’s right to an
abortion.
As repeated in all post-Casey Supreme Court abortion case law, a
woman has a right, protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, to choose to have an abortion before
viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the state.
The Ohio statute clearly places a “substantial obstacle in the path of
the woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus,” as well as a
significant obstacle post-viability since the statute contains no health
158. Preterm-Cleveland et al., v. Himes, Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief, No. 1:18-cv-109, 11 (S.D. Ohio 2018).
159. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 938 (2002).
160. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 141 (2007).
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exception for the woman in direct violation of Gonzales.161 If any
woman in Ohio mentions, or even indicates, that her reasoning “in
whole or in part” for seeking an abortion is based on the belief that
the fetus has Down syndrome or another disability, then the doctor is
prohibited from performing the abortion.162 Similar to Indiana’s law,
the Ohio law takes the “ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy
before viability” out of the woman’s hand and into the state’s.163
Even with a compelling interest that potentially “confers [medical]
benefits sufficient to justify the burdens,” the language of the Ohio
statute produces much more than a slight burden on the woman’s
right to an abortion. The Southern District Court of Ohio, therefore,
will likely follow the Indiana court’s reasoning. No matter the state’s
interest, it is not strong enough to support a prohibition of abortion
pre-viability. Thus, in light of Roe’s essential holding and Casey’s
undue burden standard, the Southern District Court of Ohio will most
likely find the Ohio selective Down syndrome ban to be an undue
burden on a woman’s fundamental right to obtain an abortion.
VI. CONCLUSION

Ohio’s Down syndrome selection abortion ban, like many other
state’s abortion bans, is likely to fail under Casey’s undue burden
analysis, in light of the traditionally compelling interests the Supreme
Court has explicitly recognized in abortion jurisprudence. However,
the Court has illustrated in Gonzales that it will consider other
interests than just the traditional state interests in the health of the
mother and the potential life of the fetus. Further, Whole Woman’s
Health redirected the undue burden analysis enough to allow the
Court to weigh the benefits and burdens of the state’s regulations
against the woman’s abortion right. If states adopt the interest in
prohibiting eugenics, the benefits conferred—protecting the public
health, combating and eradicating the discrimination of protected
classes of persons, and safeguarding the integrity and ethics of the
medical profession—may outweigh the burden that is a slight
infringement on a woman’s right to an abortion.
Yet, the infringement must be slight. Selective abortion statutes
must be narrowly tailored enough to only prohibit abortions if based
“solely” on the sex, race, or potential disability. Then, and only then,
will the Court consider the infringement slight. As prenatal genetic
testing continues to develop and become more readily available
161. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
162. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2919.10(B).
163. Casey, 505 U.S. at 879.
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regarding the fetus’ potential disabilities and other attributes, the
state’s compelling interest continues to increase both pre-viability
and post-viability, unlike previous state interests such as health of the
mother and the potential life of the fetus. Considering the burdens the
selective abortion bans impose on abortion access together with the
benefits those laws confer, it would appear that state’s selective
abortion bans might confer a benefit that is just compelling enough to
outweigh a woman’s abortion right.
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